Contrary to expectation the German high command did not elect to make a stand at the Arno but withdrew to their prepared positions north of the Sieve River. According to Intelligence reports the Division was facing four Divisions, estimated to number 12,600 men, with at least one Division of 2100 men held in reserve in the vicinity of Prato. The first extended stand was anticipated at a line running from Fontebuona, through Ferraglia, Bivigliano, and M. Senario to Il Poggiolo.

The Division moved across the Arno with the utmost secrecy on 6 September, and assembled on the north bank, screened by the British Eighth Indian Division. While the British were screening the Division's movements, however, they found that the enemy had begun to withdraw. The Eighth Indian Division, under the operational control of the 91st Division, sent out patrols constantly, in an effort to maintain contact with the withdrawing enemy. On 8 September, when patrols reached Farraglia, Bivigliano, M. Senario, and M. Calvana and found the positions unoccupied, the British units moved forward to occupy the line.

 

 

The 91st Division moved into position during the night of 9 September. The 362nd Infantry relieved the 2nd Brigade of the 1st British Division near Vaglia and the 363rd Infantry, moving through the 3rd Brigade, closed just south of Bivigliano. The Division Artillery took positions in the vicinity of Pratolino, and by 1945 all pieces were registered.

 

 

 

The attack jumped off according to plan at 100530. Advancing steadily northward, the infantrymen met no resistance. In the afternoon, when the 2nd Battalion of the 363rd Infantry cut Highway 65, near Tagliaferra, they received artillery fire, and from then on both Regiments were subjected to harassing artillery and small arms fire from enemy positions north of the Sieve River. During the night, despite the extensive minefields along the banks and stream bed of the river, troops of both Regiments waded the river and took up secure positions on the north bank. Thus the first Division objective had been secured.

The next morning, 11 September, the two Regiments continued the attack. Since the Germans had withdrawn from their outpost line upon contact, there was little resistance. Only the mountainous terrain and enemy minefields slowed the advance. At the end of the day the 362nd Infantry was just north of Gagliano, while the 363rd Infantry had occupied San Agata. The next morning the attack continued against steadily increasing resistance. The 363rd Infantry advancing toward Monticelli, and the 362nd moving on M. Calvi met small arms and mortar fire as well as harassing artillery fire. The main obstacle, however, was the mountainous terrain which grew steadily more difficult as the troops advanced toward the ridge line of the Apennines.

 

 

In the afternoon, 13 September, General Livesay, ordered the 361st Infantry committed. The Regiment was to pass through forward elements of the 363rd Infantry on the left and to attack at 140600 in the center of the Division sector. On the right, the 363rd was ordered to secure Monticelli; on the left the 362nd was ordered to secure M. Calvi and then proceed to its next objectives, M. Poggio all Ombrellino and M. Gazzaro. Thus until the 363rd reverted to reserve, the 91st Division was to have nine Battalions on line: three on the left, one moving north near Highway 65, and two attacking M. Calvi; three in the center attacking Hills 844 and 856; and three on the right attacking Monticelli. The great drive on the main defenses of the Gothic Line was now begun.

 

 

Monticelli, the objective of the 363rd Infantry, was one of the most important positions in the Gothic Line. Overlooking Il Giogo Pass, it was the left bastion of the heavily fortified Il Giogo defense area and constituted the anchor for the rest of the Gothic Line in the Division sector. It is a rocky, broken ridge, with a cone-shaped peak 3,000 feet high, wooded three-fourths of the way up, but devoid of any cover and concealment for the last 600 feet of the slope. On its sides pillboxes and dugouts had been built in such a way as to afford mutual protection for each other. These had been camouflaged very carefully so that they were invisible to the naked eye. A characteristic pillbox, large enough to accomodate five men, was of concrete construction with a roof covered with three feet of logs and dirt. In the front was a slit six inches high and three feet long.

 

 

As further protection row after row of barbed wire, one foot high and 25 feet deep, had been placed at 100 yard intervals up to the top of the mountain. In two ravines which led to the top of the mountain the enemy had laid minefields. On the reverse slope of Monticelli elaborate dugouts had been constructed. These had been dug straight back into the mountain to a distance of seventy-five feet and were large enough to accomodate twenty men. On a hill 300 yards north of Monticelli a huge dugout was found which had been blasted out of solid rock. Shaped like a U and equipped with cooking and sleeping quarters, it was large enough to accommodate 50 men.

 

 

 

On 13 September the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 363rd Infantry began the slow torturous attack. Each pillbox had to be knocked out individually by artillery or by flanking assaults by the infantry with hand grenades. Frequently minefields or wire obstacles had to be breached before the pillbox itself could be reduced. It was slow, bloody, costly fighting. In the afternoon the 2nd Battalion attacked between the 1st and 3rd Battalions and pushed under cover of a smoke screen to within 600 yards of the crest of Monticelli. The next morning, however, they were subjected to a heavy counterattack and driven from their positions.

After two days of slow progress the first break in the enemy defenses developed. Company B overran the enemy Main Line of Resistance and occupied the ridge line extending west from the peak Of Monticelli. Although the Company was subjected to counterattack after counterattack and unrelenting artillery and mortar concentrations, the flank was never turned. After one counterattack two enemy were found sleeping in Company B foxholes!

 

 

The next day while the 1st Battalion held the left flank and the 2nd Battalion maneuvered to reduce pillboxes that had held up its advance, the 3rd Battalion launched an attack on the peak. Despite every effort the intense mortar and machine gun fire stopped the attack, and it finally bogged down. On the morning of 17 September General Livesay, on the ground, laid the plans and personally supervised the preparations for the final assault. Every resource was marshaled for the effort. With every Battalion exerting maximum pressure on the enemy, the 2nd Battalion, with Company K, made an all-out assault on the peak. justifyspacerlong

 

 

 

Immediately the enemy laid an intense artillery and mortar concentration on the position and began to organize a counterattack of 200 to 300 men at a point 400 yards to the north. The company commander directed artillery fire on the area, and 46 rounds were fired in 45 minutes to break up the attack before it could get under way. Meanwhile the small band was reinforced, and at 172240 Col. Magill reported that "the situation is well in hand." During the night two Batteries of the 347th Field Artillery laid a ring of steel around Monticelli firing 4,000 rounds, a volley every three minutes. There was no counterattack; by morning, 18 September, Monticelli was occupied in strength.

 

 

Monticelli had been won by the courage and sacrifice of the 363rd Infantry and the superb support of the 347th Field Artillery and its associated units. The artillery pounded constantly at enemy positions. In one area where artillery fire had been directed for four days, 150 dead were later counted. One of the targets fired during the all-night barrage, 17-18 September proved to be a Battalion Command Post 30 feet wide dug 100 yards into the side of the mountain. The next day 33 prisoners were taken from the cave, dazed and shaken by the pounding they had received. The artillery had run the enemy into their holes, and the infantry had dug them out, and Monticelli fell.

General Keyes, Commanding General, II Corps, expressed his pride in the capture of the key position, the first break in the Gothic Line in the II Corps sector, when he telegraphed to General Livesay:

Desiring to exploit the capture of Monticelli as rapidly as possible, General Keyes ordered that the 363rd Infantry push on to the Santerno River immediately. Patrols were sent out the afternoon of 18 September and 190530 the 3rd Battalion attacked in force. Around Casanova the enemy put up a stubborn resistance to protect their withdrawal. During the night 20-21 September the enemy withdrew across the Santerno in this sector and the 2nd Battalion, which had relieved the 3rd Battalion, advanced rapidly. They organized the area up to the river and send strong patrols across the river to maintain contact with the enemy.

 

 

 

The 361st Infantry, in the center of the Divisional sector, on the left of the 363rd Infantry, attacked north from Montepoli at 140545. The sector assigned to the 361st is a bowl, surrounded on three sides by a mountain range shaped roughly like a horseshoe. At the right point lies Monticelli; at the left point lies M. Calvi. The floor of the bowl is not flat, but is cut by a ridge running north and south which rises to Hills 844 and 856. The enemy literally looked down the Regiment's throat whichever way it turned, and from their prepared positions the enemy was able to place terrific machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire upon the infantrymen advancing northward.

There was a second difficulty which hampered, to a certain extent, all the Regiments of the Division, but especially the 361st Infantry. This was the problem of supply. On the left and right, roads were available at least part of the way for the transportation of supplies, but in the 361st Infantry sector the only road of any size running north from San Agata stops at Casal. By ceaseless effort the Engineers rapidly extended a trail to Coppo adequate for quarter ton trucks which ran from Casal to Vallappero. This was unquestionably one of the most difficult assignments the Engineers completed during the month. The trail was so rocky that it was impossible to scrape the road out of the mountainside and so steep on the outside that it was equally impossible to bank it up to a passable width. Yet by blasting and chipping the rock wall and base, Company A using all three of its platoons in succession working night and day succeeded in widening the trail into a road passable to peeps.

It was dangerous, especially in the dark when the drivers could not even see the tracing tape and had to be led along the road by a convoy officer, but it was usable up to Coppo. From Coppo there were only mule trains. For days every drop of medicine and every round of ammunition and every bit of food was carried forward from Coppo on mules. The trail was so narrow and dangerous that it was necessary to set up traffic control points along the way so that the litter bearers bringing out the wounded could pass the mule trains bringing up supplies.

 

 

There were, however, excellent reasons for attacking at this point. Within the Division sector it was possible to attack here or at Futa Pass. Futa was the most heavily defended position in the Gothic Line and had the further advantage of being very easily supplied down Highway 65. The section of the Gothic Line in the sector against which the 361st attacked, although very heavily fortified, was not prepared in depth and was very difficult to supply. When the 361st Infantry broke through the Main Line of Resistance in their sector, they found that the enemy failed to solve their supply problem. Most of the prisoners captured had had no food for three to four days and their ammunition supply was very low. Thus, although the sector presented great difficulties for the Regiment in the attack, it presented equal difficulties for the defense. The wisdom of the commitment of the Regiment in this sector was borne out by the subsequent success of its drive.

 

 

At 140545 the 361st Regiment jumped off and was almost immediately subjected to fire from every side, especially from Pgio Roncolombello, Apparita, and M. Calvi, under attack by the 362nd Infantry. Despite this, good gains were made until the main enemy lines were reached late in the afternoon. It was clear from the first day's fighting that extensive use of mortars and machine guns would be necessary if any marked advances were to be made, and when General Livesay visited the Regimental Command Post late in the day, he ordered Col. Broedlow, to "Fire all the ammunition you can haul."

The next three days the advance was slowed by barbed wire entanglements, pillboxes, dug in positions, and heavy fire of all sorts. At one point the 3rd Battalion reported that in front of it were "2 banks of wire, each 15-20 feet deep with a space of 20 feet between each, which was undoubtedly heavily mined." Even 105mm artillery shells could not breach the obstacle. This could only be done by hand, always in the face of terrific fire from well-prepared positions. On one occasion an Engineer was disarming mines while the infantrymen protected him by keeping the pillbox ahead “buttoned up.” As the Engineer, prone on the ground, squirmed from mine to mine, an infantryman called to him to keep his head down. When he protested that his forehead was already touching the ground, the infantryman ordered him to turn his head over to the side so that he could maintain his protective fire!

After three days of bitter fighting, pillbox after pillbox had been captured, minefield after minefield had been breached, and barbed wire entanglements had been blown up by artillery shelling and bangalore torpedoes. Savage, bloody counterattacks had been beaten off, and the constant pounding began to tell on the enemy. The same development was observed along the entire Division front. Terrific artillery and mortar concentrations and the constant drive of the infantry had taken their toll. Replacements for the enemy were brought up as early as 13 September, but they were adequate neither in numbers or in combat training. Further, putting these replacements in the line was no small task. One prisoner reported that his group had been attacked by American bombers on the way to the line and had suffered heavy casualties. "Many men lost their weapons on the march to the MLR because they were too exhausted to carry them."

 

 

 

By 19 September the disorganization mounted; captives flowed through the prisoner of war cage. Of the 896 prisoners taken between 9 September and 30 September, 502 were captured in the four day period, 18-21 September. Although much hard fighting lay ahead, the enemy had begun to crack under the strain, and the tempo of advance picked up.

In the sector of the 361st Infantry this was especially true. By 180650 Companies A and G were reported on Hill 856 and at 180811, Company E was reported on Hill 844. The capture of Hill 844 was especially important, for it had been the most strongly fortified and most stubbornly defended hill facing the Regiment. Its loss unhinged the enemy positions in the sector and forced the Germans to retreat. Early in the afternoon as the Regiment pressed forward, the disorganization of the enemy became more and more apparent, as they took hasty positions for a brief stand and then ran back to others. Before the day was over Hill 805 had been taken.

 

 

The next day the attack continued under a tremendous rolling barrage. In rapid succession Hills 992, 1022 and l027 fell. Since the 363rd Infantry had secured the Division right flank, the 361st Infantry swept northwest along the ridge line of the Apennines. Resistance was light as the enemy fled, but the terrain was extremely broken and was made more difficult by rain. The 3rd Battalion occupied the high ground overlooking the Santerno and sent patrols to Castro San Martino: the 1st Battalion occupied positions from Segalari east to Hill 705, with Company B immediately east of the road junction at Futa Pass covering it with machine guns. Thus the Regiment stabilized its lines overlooking the Santerno River.

 

 

While the 363rd Infantry was battling for Monticelli on the left and the 361st Infantry fought for Hill 844 and 856, the 362nd Infantry was advancing up Highway 65 toward M. Calvi and Futa Pass. As in the other two sectors, the fighting was very bitter and the advance painfully slow, 13-15 September. With unwearying courage the Regiment fought justifyspacerlong

 

 

 

 

 

Shortly after noon 15 September the 1st Battalion attacked north to Morcoiano according to a plan which involved nine TOT's being delivered by the massed artillery in 15 minutes. Progress of this attack was slow but steady. Morcoiano was heavily defended, but on 18 September the town fell and the Battalion pressed on. The next morning under a "nearly perfect" rolling barrage fired by the 346th Field Artillery the assault" on Poggio began. The artillery fire did not smash the fortifications, but it forced the defenders to seek cover and "button up" completely. Then when the fire moved past a given point, before the enemy could jump out of holes to man their weapons, the infantry, just a scant 300 yards behind the barrage, was upon them. Two hundred prisoners were taken. In this way the attack literally walked through a strong point that would ordinarily have been a scene of bloody and prolonged fighting.

 

 

On the same day, 19 September, the 2nd Battalion, attacking from the southeast, captured both Hill 821 and Hill 840. Advancing rapidly to keep contact with the enemy, now driven from his Main Line of Resistance, the Battalion occupied M. Alto during the night of 19-20 September.

Although the collapse of the enemy lines in the 362nd sector was not so spectacular as it was in the 361st sector, Hill 896 was captured the next day, and by the morning of 21 September Company A had reached the Santerno and had set up machine guns trained on Futa Pass.

In the meantime the 3rd Battalion, 362nd Infantry, which had been operating almost alone, with the closest unit more than 1000 yards away, was battling north along Highway 65. Despite a warning by General Livesay that it was not to try "to win the war by itself" it was trying to do exactly that. On the morning of 16 September the Battalion had come against a spectacular Anti-tank ditch over a mile long over hill and valley and covered by interlocking fields of machine gun fire. Covering the highway was an 88mm Tiger tank gun and turret mounted in a concrete emplacement, as well as other concrete pillboxes and dugouts commanding the approaches to the Pass.

For two consecutive days the Commanding Officer of the 3rd Battalion, directed the 346th Field Artillery in a steady pounding of San Lucia. The Tiger tank gun was knocked out and two 105mm SP guns were destroyed. Every time the enemy attempted to move, the artillery hit him. On 20 September under a rolling barrage the Battalion attacked along the ridges, surprised the enemy, overran his positions, and captured Hill 689. The next day in a pincers movement they seized San Lucia and, under artillery fire which was seldom more than 300 yards ahead of the front-line troops, they took Hill 901. That night they outposted in Futa Pass in preparation for the final all-out assault against Hill 952, which commanded the vaunted Futa Pass defense system.

 

 

 

The next day, 21 September, the Battalion inched its way relentlessly up the hill against every type of fire the enemy could pour on it. Yet by nightfall it outposted positions on the summit. This was the culmination of the Division's 12 day battle to crack the Gothic Line. With the fall of Futa Pass, the door which had been unlocked at Monticelli and swung open by the drives of the 363rd and 361st Infantries literally fell off its hinge. The Gothic Line had been smashed.

 

 

In twelve days the 91st Division had broken a series of defenses the German Todt organization had worked over a year to build. Pillboxes, concrete emplacements, some so thick 105mm shells bounced off them like peas shot from a pea shooter, barbed wire, tank guns mounted in concrete turrets, minefields, and ditches, this had been the Gothic Line. Acres of timber land had been cut over to make unbroken fields of fire. Finally, all these fortifications had been constructed in the rocky broken Apennine mountains, which in themselves constituted a formidable barrier. Manning these fortifications was the 4th Paratroop Division, one of Hitler's best Divisions in Italy.

In cracking the Gothic Line the Division had fought as a team. Each separate branch of the Army contributed nobly to the accomplishment of the Division's task. The 316th Medical Battalion, its equipment and justifyspacerlong

 

 

 

For the 316th Engineer Battalion the drive from the Sieve River to the Santerno River was a continuous nightmare. The road net in the Division sector was poor, and damaged by shelling, demolitions, and rain, what roads there were became almost useless. They built roads where no roads were meant to go; they filled or by-passed giant craters; they built bridges and rebuilt them when rain- swollen streams washed them away. By their untiring efforts ammunition, medical supplies and food reached the front-line troops.

 

 

Much of the credit for breaching the Gothic Line goes to the Division Artillery, composed of the 916, 346, 347, and 348 Field Artillery Battalions, augmented by the power of II Corps artillery. For preparations fired during the campaign the Division controlled 168 guns. During the period from 11 September to 22 September, inclusive, justifyspacerlong

 

The 91st Division was a single, coordinated fighting unit. It was the Division which captured Monticelli and M. Calvi, and fought bitterly for Hills 840 and 844. It was the Division that advanced through rain and fog over steep and rocky terrain along the ridge line of the Apennines to the Santerno River. It was the whole Division which refused to be a holding force but swept northward along Highway 65 and captured Futa Pass. Great credit is due to the mule pack groups who went where motors could not go; to the 791st Ordnance Company, the 91st Quartermaster Company, the 91st Signal Company, the 91st Reconnaissance Troop, who never faltered and refused to conceive of failure. Each man in the Division had acted as if he had “wanted to win the war all by himself,” and the tales of heroism and gallantry are legion. In twelve days it had reduced to nothing a year's work of thousands of impressed laborers and had decimated the best troops Hitler could put into the line against it.